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Mean Field Games with Partial Information for Algorithmic Trading∗
Philippe Casgrain† and Sebastian Jaimungal‡
Abstract. Financial markets are often driven by latent factors which traders cannot observe. Here, we address
an algorithmic trading problem with collections of heterogeneous agents who aim to perform optimal
execution or statistical arbitrage, where all agents filter the latent states of the world, and their
trading actions have permanent and temporary price impact. This leads to a large stochastic game
with heterogeneous agents. We solve the stochastic game by investigating its mean-field game (MFG)
limit, with sub-populations of heterogeneous agents, and, using a convex analysis approach, we show
that the solution is characterized by a vector-valued forward-backward stochastic differential equation
(FBSDE). We demonstrate that the FBSDE admits a unique solution, obtain it in closed-form, and
characterize the optimal behaviour of the agents in the MFG equilibrium. Moreover, we prove
the MFG equilibrium provides an -Nash equilibrium for the finite player game. We conclude by
illustrating the behaviour of agents using the optimal MFG strategy through simulated examples.
1. Introduction. Financial markets are incredibly complex systems that have a signifi-
cant impact on how our society functions. One main source of complexity is the continuous
interaction of millions of traders (agents) all interacting simultaneously. Another is the effect
of latent factors which drive prices and hence optimal decisions. To analyse such systems
through the lens of a model, we must consider how interactions among agents affect decisions
of each individual market participant. Furthermore, the population of market participants
may be heterogeneous in their trading objectives and their behaviour types. To perform op-
timally, each agent must formulate a model of asset prices which takes into account latent
information sources, as well as the trading decisions of other market participants.
How agents should optimally process this large amount of information into trading de-
cisions is a question that the algorithmic trading literature has long attempted to answer.
Classically, algorithmic trading models only consider a single agent interacting with a stochas-
tically evolving asset price, as in [1]. Later works such as [10] study algorithmic trading where
other (multiple) agents interact with the price, but not necessarily in an optimal manner, nor
directly with the agent’s actions.
To effectively model the interaction of agents in electronic markets, we instead turn to-
wards a mean-field game (MFG) approach, which, in general, aims at approximating the
optimal actions of large populations of non-corporative interacting agents in game-like set-
tings. A large body of research has already been devoted to the study of MFGs. The original
works stem from [20], [19], and [24]. Among the many extensions and generalizations which
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explore the broad theory of MFGs as well as their applications, we highlight the following
works: [18], [17], [27], and [6]. This theory has seen application in various financial contexts,
such as [8] and [22] who use it to model systemic risk, [23] show use it for algorithmic trading
in the presence of a major agent and a population of minor agents, [5] who investigate MFG
in the context of optimal execution, and [13] who look at mean-field games in algorithmic
trading with partial information on states. [3] study a model for mini-flash crashes where
agents interact, but each agent optimizes a problem that ignores the optimal actions of other
agents, while realized prices incorporate the actions of all agents.
In contrast to other work on MFGs, as well as its specific application to algorithmic
trading, here, motivated by [11], we include latent states so that agents do not have full
information about the system dynamics. Under a very general specification for the asset price
dynamics, and allowing for heterogeneity in behaviours and objectives, we provide an optimal
strategy for all participating agents. This strategy is able to make effective use of market
price path data to filter out information about latent processes, and simultaneously account
for the actions of all other (heterogenous) market participants.
Our work sets itself apart from the current literature by approaching the algorithmic
trading problem using a MFG approach, as well, we avoid the assumption that each agent
observes the strategies of other agents, and due to the latent factor, agents do not have
complete knowledge of the model driving asset returns. We also take a novel approach to
solving the MFG by applying convex analysis techniques directly to the problem, rather than
relying on the Stochastic Maximum Principle or the dynamic programming principle. Our
approach yields powerful results such as a single optimality equation that directly characterizes
the optimal control without the use of auxiliary processes. Furthermore, we include a latent
structure in our model, causing agents to have incomplete information on the dynamics of the
market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our stochastic game
model for the finite-population market. Section 3 begins by formulating a MFG version of the
infinite player limit. The section continues by applying convex analysis tools to characterize
the optimal trading strategy as an infinite system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential
Equations (FBSDEs) coupled through a collection of mean-field processes. The system of
FBSDEs is then solved, where we provide closed-form solutions of both the individual agent’s
optimal control and for the mean-field processes. In Section 4, we show that the optimal
solution to the MFG satisfies an -Nash equilibrium property for the finite population model.
Lastly, Section 5 explores some of the optimal strategy’s behaviour by analyzing simulated
games. Section 6 concludes, and the appendices contain most proofs of the results presented
in the body of the paper.
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2. Model Setup and Motivation. In this section, we present a stochastic game where a
collection of agents all trade a single asset1. Agents interact with one another by affecting
the price of the asset through their buying and selling decisions. The model assumes agents
trade at a continuous rate over a specified time period, and mark-to-market the value of their
position at the end of the trading horizon. In contrast to most other works, we allow for agent
heterogeneity by defining sub-populations of players each with their own unique behavioural
parameters.
Each agent seeks to maximize a functional which measures their performance over the
course of the trading period. The flow of information available to each agent contains (i)
the asset price, but not latent processes which drive the price, (ii) their own state, and (iii)
their own actions (in particular we exclude the information about other agents inventories or
trading strategies). This section concludes by presenting the agent’s optimization problem
and by formally describing the Nash equilibrium we seek.
2.1. The Agent’s State Processes. Define the filtered probability space(
Ω,G,G = {Gt}t∈[0,T ],P
)
, where T > 0 is a fixed and finite time horizon. All processes defined
in this section are adapted to the filtration Gt unless otherwise stated. We assume that the
population of traders is composed of N ∈ N individual agents, each indexed by an integer
j ∈ N := {1, . . . , N}, and all agents are trading in a single asset. To allow for different trading
behaviour within this large population, the population is divided into K ≤ N disjoint sub-
populations indexed by k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}, where all traders within a sub-population are
assumed to behave homogeneously. Let us define
(2.1) K(N)k = { j ∈ N : agent j is in sub-population k }
to represent the collection of agents that belong to sub-population k, where the superscript
(N) is included to show explicit dependence on the total number of agents. We also define
N
(N)
k = #K(N)k to be the total number of agents within sub-population k, and assume the
proportion of the total population contained in each sub-population remains finite in the limit
as N becomes large, so that
(2.2) lim
N↗∞
N
(N)
k
N
= pk ∈ (0, 1) .
Each agent j controls the rate at which they buy or sell the traded asset via the process
(νjt )t∈[0,T ], where ν
j
t > 0 indicates buying and ν
j
t < 0 indicates selling. The agents keep track
of the net amount of shares they have accumulated via their (controlled) inventory process
qj,ν
j
= (qj,ν
j
t )t∈[0,T ] which satisfies
(2.3) qj,ν
j
t = Q
j
0 +
∫ t
0
νju du ,
1It is possible to generalize to trading multiple assets which have fairly arbitrary dynamics. We, however,
opt to restrict the analysis to the single asset case to ensure the key insights on how agents interact, and on
how latent information is incorporated, are not obfuscated by the interaction of multiple assets.
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where {Qj0}Nj=1 is a collection of independent random variables representing agent-j’s inventory
at the start of the trading period. We further assume the initial inventory positions of traders
have a bounded variance, so that ∃ C > 0 (independent of N) such that E[
(
Qj0
)2
] < C,
∀ j ∈ N. For a fixed strategy νj , the definition of qj,νjt in equation (2.3) corresponds to each
agent j buying or selling roughly  × νjt units of the traded asset in any small time interval
[t, t+ ]. Finally, we assume the mean of each agent’s starting inventory is the same within a
given sub-population so that E[Qj0] = mk0, ∀ j ∈ K(N)k .
The amount of cash any agent has accumulated through their trading is represented via
their (controlled) cash process {(Xj,νjt )t∈[0,T ]}j∈N. When buying or selling the asset, we assume
each trader pays an instantaneous transaction cost that is linearly proportional to the amount
of shares transacted. This instantaneous cost is expressed through the controlled dynamics of
the cash process which, for agent j, is given by
(2.4) Xj,ν
j
t = X
j
0 −
∫ t
0
(
Sν
(N)
u − ak νju
)
νju du , ∀j ∈ K(N)k ,
where ak > 0 is a parameter unique to sub-population k, and S
ν(N) = (Sν
(N)
t )t∈[0,T ] is the
(controlled) price process of the traded asset. We assume the midprice process Sν
(N)
t can be
written as
(2.5) Sν
(N)
t = S0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ ν(N)u +Au
)
du+Mt ,
where A = (At)t∈[0,T ] is a G-predictable process, M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is a G-adapted martingale
with M0 = 0, and ν
(N)
u =
1
N
∑N
j=1 ν
j
u is the average trading rate of all agents. Additionally,
we make the technical assumption that A ∈ H2T and M ∈ L2T , where
(2.6) H2T =
{
ν : Ω× [0, T ]→ R , E
[∫ T
0 ν
2
u du
]
<∞
}
is the set of P-square integrable processes on [0, T ], and where
(2.7) L2T =
{
ν : Ω× [0, T ]→ R , E [ν2t ] <∞ , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]}
is the set of processes with finite P-second-moment on the interval [0, T ]. We also assume the
components driving the price process A and M are independent of {Qj0}Nj=1, the initial values
of the agent’s inventories and that the quantity EPk
[∫ T
0 Au du
]
is invariant to any agent’s
choice of trading strategy νj ∈ H2T .
Note that, beyond the integrability conditions on A and M there are no a-priori specifica-
tions on the dynamics of these processes. We allow enough flexibility so that S may have very
general semi-martingale dynamics which may incorporate jumps or even be non-Markovian.
The only binding assumption is that order-flow from agents’ trading have linear price impact.
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Having such a general class of models allows us to obtain optimal controls that are robust to
specific model choices.
The process A characterizes the ‘alpha’ or mean trajectory of the asset price process, while
M represents the noise surrounding this drift, and both can be thought of as incorporating
the effects of information sources not available to the agents, i.e., they can be latent. The
parameter λ controls the scale of the (permanent) price impact of the agent’s strategies. The
average population price impact ν
(N)
t admits an alternative representation in terms of averages
over sub-populations,
(2.8) ν
(N)
t =
∑
k∈K
N
(N)
k
N ν
k,(N)
t , where ν
k,(N)
t :=
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)k
νjt .
This representation will be useful in the infinite population size limit studied in Section 3.
2.2. Information Restriction. In our model, we restrict the flow of information to the
agents by allowing agent j to only have access to information about the paths of the price
process Sν
(N)
t and their own inventory, but not others. More explicitly, we allow an agent j
to choose a control νj from the space of admissible controls (for agent-j)
(2.9) Aj := {ν is F j-predictable , ν ∈ H2T} ,
where for each j ∈ N we define the filtration F j = (F jt )t∈[0,T ], where
F jt = σ
(
(Sν
(N)
u )u∈[0,t]
)
∨ σ
(
Qj0
)
is the sigma algebra generated by the paths of the asset midprice process and agent j’s starting
inventory level2. If ν ∈ Aj , then Xj,νt and qj,νt are F j-adapted as well, therefore we omit the
sigma algebras generated by these processes from the definition of Aj and F j . Let us also
define the filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , such that Ft = σ
(
(Sν
(N)
u )0≤u≤t
)
, to be the filtration
generated solely by the paths of the asset midprice process.
To understand the implications of the above restriction, we can take a close look at the
dynamics of Sν
(N)
t in equation (2.5). Firstly, since agent-j is restricted to information in F j ,
they will be unable to observe the G-adapted components A and M , and they are also unable
to observe the inventory levels of other agents. Consequently, they are unable to observe the
trading strategies of all other agents. Instead, the trader must reconstruct the values of each
of these individual components only through observations of the paths of Sν
(N)
t . Both A and
M can be regarded as latent processes which, potentially, must be estimated to account for
the effect of price movements.
We now provide a simple example that illustrates this framework in the single agent case,
along the lines of the latent alpha models that [11] study. To this end, assume there is a latent
2Note: Although we do not consider it in this paper, the definition of F can just as easily be generated to
include paths of additional sources of information to the agents.
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Markov chain Θ = (Θt)t∈[0,T ] unobservable to any agent, and further assume that
(2.10) Sν
(N)
t = S0 + λ
∫ t
0
ν(N)u du+
∫ t
0
f(Θu) du+ σWt .
In this example, the large filtration G is given by Gt = σ
(
(Θt,Wt)t∈[0,T ]
) ∨ σ({Qj0}Nj=1). By
restricting agent-j to trade on the filtration F j , they may only trade based on the observed
path of the asset price and not its individual components. In an algorithmic trading setting,
it is important for agents to have a predictive model for the asset price process. Since the
dynamics of Sν
(N)
are not fully known to the agents, they will have to infer values of Θt based
on the filtration at time t in order to make predictions on the future value of the asset price.
Our set-up allows for more general latent models than this one example, but it is useful
to keep this example in mind when thinking about a concrete case. We refer the reader to
[11] for more details on latent alpha models such as the example presented here.
2.3. The Agent’s Optimization Problem. Each agent wishes to maximize an objective
functional which measures their trading performance over the trading period [0, T ]. For each
j ∈ N, let A−j :=×i∈N,i 6=j Ai, we assume that agent-j within a sub-population k ∈ K chooses
a control νj ∈ Aj to maximize a functional Hj : Aj ×A−j → R, which is defined as
(2.11) Hj(ν
j , ν−j) = E
[
Xν
j
T + q
j,νj
T
(
Sν
(N)
T −Ψk qj,ν
j
T
)
− φk
∫ T
0
(
qj,ν
j
u
)2
du
]
,
where φk ≥ 0, Ψk > 0 are constants that may vary by sub-population k, and where ν−j :=(
ν1, . . . , νj−1, νj+1, . . . , νN
)
indicates the dependence of the objective on the controls of all
other agents.
The agent’s objective is composed of three distinct parts. The first component, Xν
j
T , is the
agent’s total accumulated cash. The second component, qj,ν
j
T
(
Sν
(N)
T −Ψk qj,ν
j
T
)
, represents
the mark-to-market value of the terminal inventory and includes a liquidation penalty. Indeed,
as Ψk →∞, the agent completely liquidates their inventory by the end of the trading interval,
since, in this limit, the cost of holding non-zero inventory at time T goes to infinity. Lastly,
−φk
∫ T
0
(
qj,ν
j
u
)2
du represents a running penalty that penalizes an agent for holding large long
or short inventory positions throughout the trading period. The parameter φk can be regarded
as controlling the risk appetite of the agent, since for large values of φk, agent j will have a
great dis-incentive to take on any market exposure. This penalty can also be understood from
the perspective of the agent accounting for model uncertainty as analysed in [9].
Agents interact through the price impact term ν(N), which appears implicitly in the dy-
namics of Sν
(N)
. Agents within the same sub-population have the same objective functional,
this implies that sub-populations act in a similar manner, albeit each individual agent’s strat-
egy is adapted to their own inventory (in addition to the midprice), and hence agents’ strategies
are not identical.
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Substituting qj,ν
j
T , X
j
T , and ST using (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5), respectively into defini-
tion (2.11), using integration by parts, and taking expectations, we obtain the alternative
form of the objective functional:
(2.12)
Hj(ν
j , ν−j) = E
[
Xj0 +Q
j
0
(
S0 −ΨQj0
)
+
∫ T
0
{
qj,ν
j
t dS
ν(N)
t −
(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)ᵀ(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)
dt
}]
.
This representation makes the influence of the parameter triplet (ak, φk,Ψk) on the objective
function explicit. The triplet, which is shared amongst all members of sub-population k,
will have a direct impact on the agent’s behaviour. The variation of this triplet across sub-
populations allows us to incorporate heterogeneous agents.
Remark 2.1. The model presented above is designed so that agents are incentivized to
gradually bring their inventory levels qj,t towards zero over the course of the trading period. In
particular, an agent-j in sub-population k is penalized for non-zero exposure by the terminal
liquidation penalty −Ψk (qj,ν
j
T )
2 and the running penalty −φk
∫ T
0 (q
j,νj
t )
2 dt which both appear
in the expression for the objective function (2.11).
It is possible to generalize this model to instead pressure agents to bring their inventory
levels towards some stochastic trading target {QjT }Nj=1, so that agent-j is instead penalized for
deviating from its trading target QjT at time T , rather than deviating from 0. This can be
achieved by replacing the former terminal liquidation and running penalties with −Ψk(qj,ν
j
T −
QjT )
2 and −φk
∫ T
0 (q
j,νj
t −Qjt )2dt, respectively. Because of the linear structure in the midprice
model, it is easy to show that this modification to the objective function is exactly equivalent to
modifying the initial condition of the process qj, from qj,ν
j
0 = Q
j
0 to q
j,νj
0 = Q
j
0 −QjT for each
j ∈ N. If we impose the conditions that {Qj0 −QjT }Tj=1 are independent, that E(Qj0 −QjT )2 <
C ∀ j ∈ N, and that E[Qj0 −QjT ] = mk0 ∀ j ∈ K(N)k , then all of the results that follow in the
remainder of the paper apply for the generalized model with stochastic trading targets, which
is done by simply replacing the initial condition of each inventory process with Qj0 −QjT .
2.4. The Stochastic Game. As mentioned earlier, all agents seek to maximize their own
objective function, and we seek the optimal strategy for all agents. More formally, we seek a
collection of controls {ωj ∈ Aj : j ∈ N} such that
(2.13) ωj = arg sup
ω∈Aj
Hj(ω, ω
−j) , ∀j ∈ N .
Identifying this collection of controls is no easy feat, since the objective functional for each
agent is affected by the controls of all agents. Furthermore, the set of admissible controls differs
between agents – recall each agent has access to the filtration generated by the midprice and
their inventory only. This latter observation posses difficulties since the set of optimal controls
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we are searching for, and the random processes present in the objective function (2.11), are
adapted to different filtrations. This fact prevents us from (directly) applying the standard
set of dynamic programming or stochastic maximum principle tools to solve the problem.
3. Solving the Mean-Field Stochastic Game. The stochastic game we aim to solve
presents a number of obstacles which prohibit it from being solved directly. In this sec-
tion, we overcome these obstacles by instead solving a MFG version of the stochastic game.
To construct the MFG, we take the limit as the population size tends to infinity. In the limit,
the finite player game becomes a (stochastic) MFG where agents no longer interact directly
with one another, but instead interact through a set of mean-field processes (one for each
sub-population). In the remainder of this section, we present the MFG that results from the
infinite population limit, provide a closed-form representation of each agent’s optimal strat-
egy, and a closed-form representation of the mean-field processes within the game. Although
we do not explicitly solve the finite player game presented in Section 2, by establishing an
-Nash equilibrium property in Section 4, we show that the equilibrium solution obtained for
the MFG provides an good approximation to the finite population game, provided that the
population size is large enough.
We begin the section by taking the population limit of the stochastic game, and of each
agent’s objective functional as N → ∞, to yield a new limiting objective function and a
(stochastic) MFG. Focusing on this limiting objective functional, we proceed by applying
tools from convex analysis to obtain the optimal action for each agent in the form of the
solution to a vector-valued forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). Next,
we obtain the equilibrium in the MFG by explicitly solving the FBSDE.
3.1. The Limiting Mean-Field Game. From (2.12), we see the only term that depends
on the population size N , within each objective functional, is the average trading rate of all
agents (ν
(N)
t )t∈[0,T ]. Moreover, this dependence appears only through the midprice dynamics
Sν
(N)
.
To formulate the limiting problem, we make some additional assumptions regarding the
existence of a limit of the average trading rate. Let us assume that there exist processes
νk = (νkt )t∈[0,T ] for k ∈ K so that νk ∈ H2T and νk is F-predictable, where
(3.1) lim
N↗∞
ν
k,(N)
t = ν
k
t , P× µ a.e. ,
µ is the Lebesgue measure on the Borel sigma algebra on [0, T ], and P × µ is the canonical
product measure of P and µ.
Remark 3.1. The assumption that each νk is F-predictable can be relaxed to being pre-
dictable w.r.t to the finer filtration ∨j∈NF j without any change to the results that follow.
We call each of the processes {νk}k∈K the sub-population mean-fields, where each component
represents the limiting average trading rate within a given sub-population. Due to the as-
sumptions on the relative size of the sub-populations (see (2.2)), in the limit as N →∞, the
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total average rate of trading ν(N) exists. More specifically, let us define the population mean-
field to be the process ν = (νt)t∈[0,T ] where νt = limN↗∞ ν
(N)
t , then νt exists and admits the
representation
(3.2) νt =
∑
k∈K
pk ν
k
t , P× µ a.e. ,
where {pk}k∈K represent the limiting proportions of each sub-population as defined in equa-
tion (2.2). With these assumptions, the limiting dynamics of the asset price process satisfies
the (controlled) SDE
(3.3) dSνt =
(
At + λ
∑
k∈K
pk ν
k
t
)
dt+ dMt ,
where we replace all of the price impact terms with their limits.
Since we restrict agent-j to trading actions νj from the admissible setAj ⊂ H2T , asN →∞,
each agent’s individual contribution to ν
(N)
t vanishes. Furthermore, upon inspection of the
definition of agent-j’s objective functional in equation (2.12), we see the dependence on ν−j
appears only through the process ν(N), which converges to νt in the limit. These two remarks
imply that as N → ∞, each agent’s objective functional no longer depends directly on ν−j ,
but rather it depends on the population statistic νt, representing the average price impact of
all agents in the limit. For ease of notation, we therefore suppress the second argument of the
objective functional in the limit. Hence, an agent j in sub-population k, seeks to maximize
the functional Hj : Aj → R,
(3.4) Hj(ν
j) = E
[∫ T
0
{
qj,ν
j
t dS
ν
t −
(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)ᵀ(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)}
dt
]
,
which we obtain using representation (2.12) and omitting the constant terms. This above ob-
jective function implicitly depends on the processes {νk}Kk=1, which we will need to determine
when proceeding with the agent’s optimization problem.
We next aim to solve the mean-field stochastic game by identifying a set of strategies
which form a Nash equilibrium. In other words, we seek a collection of controls {νj}∞j=1 so
that
(3.5) νj = arg sup
νj∈Aj
Hj(ν) ,
for all j ∈ N. Because of the definition of νt, we require the collection of controls to simulta-
neously satisfy the consistency condition
(3.6) νt = lim
N↗∞
1
N
N∑
j=1
νjt .
10 CASGRAIN, P. AND JAIMUNGAL, S.
This optimal control problem is of a similar form to the discrete population game, with the
main difference lying in the consistency condition imposed on the collection of controls at the
optimum.
The model we use here falls into the class of extended mean-field games of controls, such
as in in [16, 7]. The particular ‘fixed-point’ formulation of the mean-field which appears
through the consistency condition (3.6) follows the approach to mean-field games of [19, 27, 13],
amongst others.
3.2. Solving the Agent’s Optimization Problem. In this section, we solve for the collec-
tion of controls that form a Nash equilibrium for the MFG. To achieve this, we use techniques
from the convex analysis literature in a similar in spirit to the approach used in [2] for the
problem of optimal hedging. We conclude by demonstrating that the agent’s optimal control
can be represented as the solution to a particular linear vector-valued FBSDE.
Solving for an optimal control for objective function Hj , defined in (3.4), presents some
challenges due to the latent information structure, stemming from the agents inability to
observe the individual components of the midprice process. Each agent aims to find an F j-
adapted control to maximize an objective function containing costs that are adapted to the
filtration G ⊇ F j . These G adapted processes appear solely in the dynamics of the midprice
process Sνt . Due to this latent information, it is not possible to directly apply standard
stochastic control techniques to obtain the agent’s optimal behaviour.
Instead of taking a direct approach, we first represent the midprice process in terms of a
pair of F-adapted processes. This will allow us to re-write Hj in terms of processes that are
F j-adapted, thus resolving the issue of latent information. This can be achieved by applying
the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Define the process Â = (Ât)t∈[0,T ] where Ât = E [At | Ft]. Then Â is an H2T ,
F-adapted process. Furthermore, there exists an F-adapted L2T martingale M̂ = (M̂t)t∈[0,T ]
such that
(3.7) Sνt = S0 +
∫ t
0
(
Âu + λ νu
)
du+ M̂u .
The process M̂ is known as the innovations process for the filter Â.
Proof. The proof is found in A.1
Since A and M are independent of the agent’s initial inventories {Qj0}∞j=1, the projection of
the dynamics of Sν onto the filtration F will be identical to the projection onto F j . Moreover,
since Ft ⊆ F jt , the processes Â and M̂ are adapted to the each individual agent’s filtration.
Lemma 3.2 provides us with a representation of Sν in terms of F-adapted processes rather
than the G-adapted version in 2.5. Plugging in these F-dynamics into the expression for Hj
in (2.12), and noticing that the martingale terms vanish under the expectation, we obtain an
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objective functional entirely in terms of F j-adapted processes,
(3.8) Hj(ν
j) = E
[∫ T
0
{
qj,ν
j
t
(
Ât + λ νt
)
−
(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)ᵀ(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)}
dt
]
.
In this representation, the partial information problem is cast into a full information prob-
lem, and we can now apply convex analysis tools to this objective functional. The essence of
the steps used to obtain the solution resembles very closely those used in elementary calculus
to find critical points of functions. First, show that the objective function is ‘differentiable’
and strictly concave. Since the argument of Hj is a stochastic process, we refer to ‘differentia-
bility’ in the sense of the Gaˆteaux directional derivative3. Next, identify where the Gaˆteaux
derivative vanishes to characterize the objective functional’s critical points. Finally, knowing
that the objective function is strictly concave, guarantees that the critical point is unique and
that it is a maximum. The lemmas that follow show that H
j
is both concave and everywhere
Gaˆteaux differentiable in Aj .
Lemma 3.3. The functional Hj defined in equation (2.11) is strictly concave in Aj.
Proof. The proof is found in A.2.
Lemma 3.4. The objective function Hj is everywhere Gaˆteaux differentiable in Aj. Its
Gaˆteaux derivative at a point ν ∈ Aj in a direction ω ∈ Aj can be expressed as
〈DHj(ν), ω〉 = E[∫ T
0
ωt E
[
− 2 ak νt − 2 Ψk qj,νT
+
∫ T
t
{
Âu + λ νu − 2φk qj,νu
}
du
∣∣∣∣F jt
]
dt
]
.
(3.9)
Proof. The proof is found in A.3.
Since the objective functional Hj is concave and Gaˆteaux differentiable, an element ν ∈ Aj
that makes the Gaˆteax derivative vanish in an arbitrary direction ω ∈ Aj is guaranteed to
be a maximizer. Moreover, since the concavity of Hj is strict, the maximizer is unique. The
explicit form of the derivative in expression (3.9) allows us to find a representation of the
agent’s optimal strategy. The following proposition uses these last two results to represent
the trader’s optimal strategy as the solution to an FBSDE.
Proposition 3.5. The collection of controls
{
νj,∗
}
j∈N forms a Nash equlibrium if and only
if for each agent-j in sub-population k, νj,∗ ∈ H2T and νj,∗ is the unique strong solution to the
FBSDE
(3.10)
 −d(2 ak ν
j,∗
t ) =
(
Ât + λ νt − 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
t
)
dt− dMjt ,
2 ak ν
j,∗
T = −2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T ,
3For more information on the Gaˆteaux derivative and its role in convex optimization, see [12, Section 5].
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where Mj ∈ H2T is an F j-adapted martingale and νt := lim
N→∞
1
N
∞∑
j=1
νj,∗t .
Proof. The proof is found in A.4.
Equation (3.10) is an FBSDE since it has a forward component coming from the processes
qj,ν
j,∗
and Â, as well as a backward component νj,∗, which must be solved simultaneously. A
solution to equation (3.10) is the unique optimal control for agent-j and maximizes their ob-
jective functional. Note that all agent’s optimal strategies are coupled through these FBSDEs
via the mean-field process ν which appears in the driver of equation (3.10), and they must all
satisfy the consistency condition. As well, the parameters in the performance criteria depend
on the specific sub-population to which the agent belongs.
3.3. Solving the Mean Field Equations. In the MFG limit, the infinite dimensional
stochastic game is reduced to solving the FBSDE (3.10) system. The FBSDE for agent-
j’s optimal control shows there is no direct dependence on any other individuals’ choice of
strategy. Instead, the effect of all other agents appear through the mean field process ν.
Hence, rather than having the explicit dependence of one νj,∗ on ν−j,∗, we have an implicit
dependence on ν−j,∗ through the mean field process ν. Furthermore, since the FBSDE (3.10)
depends on a particular agent’s sub-population, it is necessary to separate the problem across
sub-populations and solve for each of their mean-fields and optimal controls.
In the remainder of the section we solve the FBSDE (3.10). The main obstacle in solving
the FBSDE is that the mean-field process ν depends on the solution of each νj and vice versa,
through the driver of the FBSDE. To overcome this obstacle, we first decompose the mean-
field process as the average of the sub-population mean fields, i.e., write νt =
∑
k∈K pk ν
k
t .
Next, we formulate an ansatz for each νkt , which we then use to find a corresponding ansatz
of the solution to νj . We then conclude by demonstrating that the ansatz solutions for both
{νj}j∈N and {νk}k∈K indeed form the unique solution to the FBSDE problem (3.10).
3.3.1. An Ansatz for the Mean-Field Processes. Our first task is to propose an ap-
propriate form of each sub-population mean-field process νk. Our proposed ansatz for each
sub-population mean-field is denoted by the process ν˜k = (ν˜kt )t∈[0,T ], ∀ k ∈ K, and solves the
FBSDE
(3.11)
 −d(2 ak ν˜kt ) =
(
Ât + λ
∑
k′∈K pk′ ν˜
k′
t − 2φk q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
dt− dMkt ,
2 ak ν˜
k
T = −2 Ψk q˜k,ν˜
k
T ,
where the (controlled) forward processes q˜k,ν˜
k
= (q˜k,ν˜
k
t )t∈[0,T ] are given by q˜
k,ν˜k
t = m
k
0 +∫ t
0 ν˜
k
u du, m
k
0 = E[Q
j
0], and where M
k
= (Mkt )t∈[0,T ] is a suitable F-adapted martingale
satisfying Mk ∈ H2T . It is worth pointing out that the martingales appearing here are all
F-adapted, and not F j-adapted as in (3.10). We will nonetheless see that the ansatz does
indeed provide a solution to our original problem.
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The FBSDEs in (3.11) can be viewed as resulting from taking the average over all j ∈ Kk
of the FBSDEs (3.10), and explicitly splitting the overall mean-field in terms of the sub-
population mean-fields. Since the system is an average over an infinite number of objects,
there is no guarantee that the solution to this ‘average’ FBSDE will exactly match the sub-
population mean-field process νk. We show in Theorem 3.9 that the solution to (3.11) does
indeed provide us with the mean field process νkt = limN↗∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)k
νjt , where ν
j is the
solution to the FBSDE (3.10).
We now solve the collection FBSDEs (3.11) using an approach similar to (but not the
same as) the ‘four-step method’ of [26]. The linear structure of the coupling of the FBSDEs
plays a key role, and we re-write the collection as a single vector-valued equation. First,
let ν˜ t =
(
ν˜kt
)
k∈K be the column vector of the ansatzes for each sub-population mean-field.
Stacking each of the mean-field FBSDE (3.11) results in the vector valued equation,
(3.12)
 −d(2a ν˜ t) =
(
Ât 1
(K×1) + Λ ν˜ t − 2φ q˜t
)
dt− dMt ,
2a ν˜T = −2Ψ q˜T ,
where a,φ,Ψ and Λ are all real-valued K ×K matrices defined as
a = diag ({ak}k∈K) , φ = diag ({φk}k∈K) ,
Ψ = diag ({Ψk}k∈K) , Λ =
λ p1 . . . λ pK... ...
λ p1 . . . λpK
 ,
q˜t = m0 +
∫ t
0 ν˜u du, and Mt = (M
k
t )
K
k=1 is a column vector of F-adapted martingales with
Mkt ∈ H2T , ∀k ∈ K.
Due to the linear structure of the vector-value FBSDE (3.12), we make the further ansatz
that there are two F-adapted processes g1 = (g1,t)t∈[0,T ] and g2 = (g2,t)t∈[0,T ], where g1,t ∈ RK
and g2,t ∈ RK×K , such that the solution to (3.12) can be expressed as
(3.13) 2a ν˜ t = g1,t + g2,t q˜t .
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the above expression, inserting the result back into (3.12), and
grouping terms by q˜, yields
(3.14)
0 =
{
dg1,t +
(
1(K×1)Ât + (Λ + g2,t) (2a)−1 g1,t
)
dt− dMt
}
+
{
dg2,t +
(
(Λ + g2,t) (2a)
−1 g2,t − 2φ
)
dt
}
q˜t .
Equation (3.14) must hold P × µ almost everywhere for all q˜t, hence, the terms within each
curly brace vanish independently. Moreover, we can apply the same argument to the boundary
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condition of ν˜ to yield two coupled BSDEs for g1 and g2 which no longer depend on the forward
process q˜t. The first of these is a linear BSDE for g1,
(3.15)
−dg1,t =
(
1(K×1)Ât + (Λ + g2,t) (2a)−1 g1,t
)
dt− dMt ,
g1,T = 0
(K×1) ,
and a matrix-valued ODE for the value for g2,
(3.16)
−dg2,t =
(
(Λ + g2,t) (2a)
−1 g2,t − 2φ
)
dt ,
g2,T = −2Ψ .
There is a one-way dependence structure in these equations. Equation (3.15) is a linear
BSDE that depends on the solution for g2, while equation (3.16) is a matrix-valued non-
symmetric Riccati equation that is independent of g1. Let us also note that equation (3.16) is
an ordinary differential equation which is deterministic since it has no Martingale term and has
a deterministic boundary condition. Such vector and matrix-valued BSDEs are reminiscent
of those appearing in [4]. The solutions to (3.15) and (3.16) are presented in the proposition
that follows.
Proposition 3.6. There exists a unique solution g2,t to the matrix valued ODE (3.16) that
is bounded over the interval [0, T ].
Moreover, let Y t : [0, T ]→ R2K×K be defined as
(3.17) Y t = e
(T−t)B
(
I (K×K), −2Ψ
)ᵀ
,
where B ∈ R2K×2K is the block matrix
(3.18) B =
(
0(K×K) −(2a)−1
−2φ Λ(2a)−1
)
.
If we define the matrix partition Y t = (Y 1,t,Y 2,t)
ᵀ, where Y 1,t,Y 2,t ∈ RK×K , then g2,t can be
expressed as
(3.19) g2,t = Y 2,tY
−1
1,t .
Furthermore, the BSDE (3.15) admits a closed form solution,
(3.20) g1,t =
∫ T
t
: e
∫ u
t (Λ+g2,s)(2a)
−1 ds : 1(K×1) E [Au|Ft] du ,
where : e
∫ u
t · ds : represents the time-ordered exponential 4. Moreover, E[
∫ T
0 g
ᵀ
1,t g1,t dt] <∞.
4We define the time-ordered exponential of a matrix-valued function f : [0, T ]→ RK×K , ηt,u = : e
∫ u
t f s ds :,
with t ≤ u, to be the unique solution to the matrix-valued ODE dηt,u = ηt,u f u du with the initial condition
ηt,u = I
(K×K).
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Proof. The proof is found in B.1.
The processes g1 and g2 found in the above proposition provide us with a solution to the
vector-valued FBSDE (3.12). We summarize the results in the proposition that follows.
Proposition 3.7. Define the process ν˜ = (ν˜ t)t∈[0,T ], where ν˜ ∈ RK and
(3.21) ν˜ t = (2a)
−1 (g1,t + g2,t q˜t) .
where g1,t and g2,t are the functions given in the statement of Proposition 3.6, i.e., equations
(3.20) and (3.19). Then ν˜ t is the unique solution to the FBSDE (3.12).
Furthermore, let ν˜kt be the kth element of the vector ν˜ t, then for each k ∈ K, ν˜k ∈
⋂∞
j=1Aj
and {ν˜kt }k∈K form the solution to the collection of FBSDEs (3.11).
Proof. The proof is found in B.2.
Furthermore, since ν˜ t represents the ansatz vector for each sub-population mean-field, we
may represent the total mean-field effect implied by the ansatz ν˜ t as ν˜t =
∑
k∈K pk ν˜
k
t .
3.4. An Ansatz for Agent’s Optimal Control. We now use the ansatz derived in sec-
tion 3.3.1 to derive an optimal control for each individual agent under the assumption that
νt = ν˜t (we show that indeed the solution is optimal in the next subsection). Consider the
FBSDE (3.10) for the optimal trading rate of an agent j in sub-population k. Replacing the
true mean field νt with our ansatz ν˜t in the optimality equation (3.10), we obtain the FBSDE
(3.22)
 −d(2 ak ν
j
t ) =
(
Ât + λ
ᵀ ν˜ t − 2φk qj,ν
j
t
)
dt− dMjt ,
2 ak ν
j
T = −2 Ψk qj,ν
j
T ,
where λ = (λpk)k∈K and Mjt is some square-integrable F j-adapted martingale. By solving
this FBSDE, we find each agent’s optimal control, assuming that the mean-field process is
exactly equal to the ansatz derived in section 3.3.1.
We solve the FBSDE (3.22) along similar lines as the approach we took in solving (3.12).
Doing so leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.8. Let agent−j be a member of sub-population k, then the solution to the
FBSDE (3.22) is
(3.23) νjt = ν˜
k
t +
1
2ak
hk2,t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
,
where ν˜kt is defined in Proposition 3.7 and h
k
2,t : [0, T ]→ R is defined as
(3.24) hk2,t = −2ξk
(
Ψk cosh (−γk(T − t) )− ξk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
ξk cosh (−γk(T − t) )−Ψk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
)
,
where we the constants γk =
√
φk/ak and ξk =
√
φkak. Moreover, h
k
2,t ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
and νj ∈ Aj.
Proof. The proof is found in B.3
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3.5. Showing the Solution is Optimal. At this point we have solved the optimality equa-
tion (3.10) under the assumption that the mean-field ν equals the ansatz mean-field process ν˜.
To show that the solution provided in Proposition 3.8 indeed solves the optimality equation, we
need to demonstrate that ν˜ is the true mean-field, i.e., that ν˜t = νt = limN→∞ 1N
∑N
j=1 ν
j
t . To
this end, we consider the error within a sub-population k ∈ K, ∆kt = νkt − ν˜kt and demonstrate
that it equals zero. The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9. Let νjt be the processes defined in Proposition 3.8, and ν˜
k
t be the processes
defined in Proposition 3.7. Then for each k ∈ K
(3.25) ν˜kt = lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)k
νjt , P× µ-almost everywhere .
Hence, the process
(3.26) νj,∗t = ν˜
k
t +
1
2ak
hk2,t
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
is the solution to the optimality equation (3.10), where ν˜kt = ν
k
t P× µ a.e. and
(3.27) νj,∗ = arg sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν) .
Proof. The proof is found in B.4.
This theorem guarantees that the ansatz for the mean-field processes and each agent’s
control are indeed correct. Hence, for the MFG version of our stochastic game, we have
closed-form solutions for the optimal strategy of each individual agent, the sub-population
mean-fields, and the overall population mean-field.
3.6. Properties of the Agent’s Optimal Control. From Proposition 3.7 (and Theorem
3.9), the mean-field trading rates within a sub-population can be written
(3.28) ν t = (2a)
−1 (g1,t + g2,t q¯t ) ,
where q¯t = µ0 +
∫ t
0 ν t dt. The general structure of this mean-field strategy closely corresponds
to the structure obtained for the single agent latent alpha model in [11].
The within sub-population mean-fields can be decomposed into two parts. The first part,
(2a)−1 g1,t, represents the portion of the mean field trading rate that can be attributed to
trading on alpha. This is evident from the representation of g1 in equation (3.20), which
shows that g1 is the weighted average of the expected future drift of the asset. Moreover,
this expected future drift is computed by conditioning on the agent’s visible filtration only,
meaning that the agent obtains the best possible estimate of the asset’s alpha based on the
information they have.
The second part, (2a)−1 g2,t q¯t, consists of a deterministic function multiplied by the vector
of ‘mean-field inventories’. It admits the interpretation that the sub-population mean-field
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trading rates each induce the sub-population mean inventories towards zero (so that the
terminal liquidation penalty is minimized), while simultaneously being conscious of the ‘mean-
field inventories’ of all other sub-populations.
From the result in Theorem 3.9, an agent j in sub-population k, follows the strategy
(3.29) νj,∗t = ν
k
t +
1
2ak
hk2,t
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯kt
)
.
Thus, each agent trades at the sub-population mean-field rate plus a correction term. Since
hk2,t is strictly negative, this correction term tends to push the agent’s inventory towards the
sub-population’s mean-field inventory. To formally show this, recall that dqj,ν
j
t = ν
j
t dt for
any νj ∈ Aj . Hence, from (3.29), we have
(3.30) d
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯kt
)
= 12akh
k
2,t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q¯kt
)
dt .
This admits the solution
(3.31)
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯kt
)
=
(
qj0 − q¯k0
)
e
1
2ak
∫ t
0 h
k
2,udu .
Since hk2,t < 0, it is clear that |qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯kt | is a monotonically decreasing function of time.
4. The -Nash Equilibrium Property. In the previous section, we explicitly constructed
the unique optimal trading actions of all agents in infinite population limit – the optimal
actions in the MFG. In this section, we explore the properties resulting from applying the
MFG optimal controls to the finite player game. More specifically, we show that the controls
satisfy the -Nash equilibrium property.
Definition 4.1. A set of controls
{
ωj ∈ Aj : j ∈ N} forms an -Nash equilibrium with a
collection of objective functionals {Jj(·, ·) : j ∈ N}, if there exists  > 0, s.t.
(4.1) Jj(ω
j , ω−j) ≤ sup
ω∈A
Jj(ω, ω
−j) ≤ Jj(ωj , ω−j) +  , ∀j ∈ N.
The definition of an -Nash equilibrium characterizes a collection of controls that deviates
no farther than  from the Nash equilibrium of the collection of objective functions. We will
prove that the optimal MFG controls obtained in section 3 satisfies the -Nash property for
any finite game with a large enough population size. In particular, we show that for any given
 > 0, there exists a population size N so that the -Nash property holds for any population
of size N > N.
Theorem 4.2 (-Nash equilibrium). Consider the collection of objective functions {Hj : j ∈ N}
defined in equation (2.11) and the set of optimal mean-field controls {νj,∗}∞j=1 defined in equa-
tion (3.29). Suppose that there exists a sequence {δN}∞N=1 such that δN → 0 and
(4.2)
∣∣∣∣N(N)kN − pk∣∣∣∣ = o(δN )
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for all k ∈ K, then
(4.3) Hj(ν
j,∗, ν∗,−j) ≤ sup
ν∈A
Hj(ν, ν
∗,−j) ≤ Hj(νj,∗, ν∗,−j) + o( 1N ) + o(δN )
for each j ∈ N.
Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.1.
Theorem 4.2 implies that for any fixed value of , we can identify the minimum population
size, N, so that the -Nash property holds for all N > N. More specifically, the theorem
states that the size of the quantity N will grow as  → 0 at a super-linear rate that is a
function of the sequence δN . The special case where the rate of growth of N is exactly linear
occurs when o(δN ) ≤ o( 1N ).
From a more intuitive standpoint, Theorem 4.2 simply tells us that the mean-field optimal
controls are always a ‘good enough’ substitute for the optimal finite-game controls provided
that the population size is large enough.
It is important to note that in the finite payer game, agents cannot use the empirical mean-
field in their individual strategies, since it is not measurable with respect to each agent’s visible
filtration. They instead generate a ‘fictitious’ mean-field inventory process (q¯t)t∈[0,T ] which
trades at the rate of (ν t)t∈[0,T ] according to (3.28). These fictitious mean-field inventories then
feed into the individual agent’s trading strategy νj,∗ according to the result in Theorem 3.9.
5. Numerical Experiments. In this section we study the behaviour of the mean-field
optimal controls through simulations of the finite player game. We consider a model where
the asset price process is a mean-reverting pure-jump process with a latent (unobservable)
process driving the dynamics. Agents must filter the value of the latent process from observed
paths of the asset price, and to use this filter to make predictions on the future (expected)
value of the asset price process. We conclude by exploring some of the properties of the agent’s
trading decisions by interpreting simulation results.
We begin by defining the un-impacted asset price process F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]. The process Ft
is defined as
(5.1) Ft = α
(
L+t − L−t
)
,
where L± = (L±t )t∈[0,T ] are counting processes each with respective stochastic intensity pro-
cesses γ± = (γ±t )t∈[0,T ], and the constant α > 0 represents the tick size for the asset price.
The process F is defined so that it may only jump up or down by a single tick during any
small instant in time.
As previously mentioned, we wish the asset price process to be mean reverting and to
include some latent component in its dynamics. To achieve this, we define each intensity
process so that
(5.2) γ±t = σ + κ (Θt − Ft)± ,
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where ( · )± represents the positive or negative part of its argument and Θ = (Θt)t∈[0,T ] is
a latent process. This specification causes the un-impacted asset price F to mean-revert to
Θ. Lastly, we define the process Θ to be an M -state continuous time Markov chain with
generator matrix5 C , taking values in the set {θi}Mi=1. We also assumed that the initial value
of the latent process, Θ0, has prior distribution pi = {pim}Mm=1, where pim = P(Θ0 = θm).
The un-impacted asset price process can be viewed as a pure-jump analogue to an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. The parameter κ controls the strength of the mean reversion of F towards
Θ, while the parameter σ controls the base level of noise in the paths of F . We point the
reader to [11, Section 6] for further exposition of this model.
As before, we assume there is a total population of N players divided into K sub-
populations all trading the same asset S. The asset price process S is assumed to be given
by
(5.3) Sν
(N)
t = Ft + λ q¯
(N)
t ,
which can also be recast in the semi-martingale representation as in equation (2.5). Each
agent chooses their trading strategy according to the mean-field optimal control derived in
Section 3. Each of the terms that need to be computed for this control can be obtained in
closed form up to inverses and the computation of inverses, matrix exponentials and ordered
exponentials. We set the initial inventory values of all agents to i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables. More specifically, for an agent j in sub-population k, we assume that
(5.4) Qk0 ∼ N (mk0, σ¯k0 )
for constants {mk0}Kk=1 and {σ¯k0}Kk=1. Each agent participating in the game must compute the
values of {νk}Kk=1 and {q¯k}Kk=1 to be able to determine their own trading strategy. The agents
achieve this by using the results of Propositions 3.6 and 3.8 to compute ν t and to evolve the
value of the ‘fictitious’ mean-field inventory process q¯t. To compute g1,t, each agent must
compute the conditional expected value E
[
Au
∣∣Ft], where At = κ (Ft −Θt). To achieve this,
agents use the observed path of Sν
(N)
up until time t to compute the posterior distribution
of the current value of the latent process Θt, which they use to compute the expected future
return on the asset price. The expected value can be computed in closed form for this latent
alpha model and its solution is presented and discussed in detail in [11, Section 6].
We perform simulations of a game with K = 2 distinct (unequal) sub-populations and
a total of N = 30 agents. We allow agents to trade in the finite time interval ending at
T = 1, representing the length of one whole trading day. The Table 1 below lays out the
parameters for the starting distribution of inventories and for the objective function for each
sub-population.
5The generator matrix C ∈ RM×M of a M -state continuous time Markov chain Θ has non-diagonal entries
C i,j ≥ 0 if i 6= j and diagonal entries C i,i = −∑j 6=iC i,j . C is defined so that P (Θt = θj |Θ0 = θi) = (etC)i,j ,
where
(
etC
)
i,j
is element (i, j) of the matrix exponential of tC .
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k mk0 σ¯
k
0 Nk Ψk φk ak
1 100 50 20 100 10−2 10−4
2 0 50 10 100 10−3 10−4
Table 1: Simulation Parameters for the two sub-population of agents.
We set the first sub-population of agents to be long the asset on average at the start of
the game, whereas the second starts off holding no inventory on average. We also make sub-
population 2 more inclined to trade on alpha by making their φ1 parameter (which controls
their risk appetite) considerably smaller than for sub-population 1. Both sub-populations have
the same instantaneous transaction cost parameter ak, and we set the size of sub-population
2 to be twice that of sub-population 1. Lastly, we set the Ψk parameter to be very large to
force agents to fully liquidate their inventories by t = T .
In the simulation, we assume that the latent process can take M = 2 possible states and
that Θt ∈ {4.95, 5.05}. This causes the price to either mean-revert up or down depending on
the state of Θt. The remaining asset price process parameters are presented in Table 2 below.
F0 = $5, α = $0.01 pi = ( 0.50.5 ) C =
[−1 1
1 −1
]
,
κ = 360, σ = 120.24, λ = $10−3.
Table 2: The parameters used for the asset price dynamics and for the latent process.
The asset price is set to start at $5 and can mean-revert to either $4.95 or $5.05 over the
course of the trading period. We set the tick value , α, in this model to be 1 cent so that the
un-impacted asset price may only jump by increments of this size. The values of pi are chosen
specifically so that agents have no particular preference for the starting value of the latent
process. Furthermore, because of the choice of the generator matrix C , the agent expects that
the latent process will switch states (on average) once over the course of the trading period
t ∈ [0, 1]. The values of κ and σ are chosen to be relatively close to re-scaled values obtained
from calibrating the model to market prices in [11]. Lastly, the permanent impact parameter
λ is chosen to be 10 times larger than the temporary impact parameter ak – which is line with
the empirical studies in [10].
During the simulation, we set a fixed path for Θt to be able to observe the agents’ filtering
performance. More specifically, we let Θt start off at Θ0 = 4.95, and then make it jump to
Θt = 5.5 at time t = 0.5 and let it remain there until the end of the trading period. We
show an example simulated path for the asset price and latent process, the agent’s posterior
distribution for the value of Θt, and the individual agents’ inventory paths over the course of
the trading period in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Simulated paths for the price process, latent process, the agent’s filter, and the
individual agent’s inventory paths. In the right most panel: the red lines represents sub-
population 1 and the blue lines represent sub-population 2. The thin lines represent the paths
of an agent’s inventory, the thick dashed lines represent the average of inventories for all agents
within a sub-population. The thick crossed lines represent the mean-field process for a given
sub-population.
The left panel in Figure 1 shows how the asset price first mean-reverts downwards when
Θt is in its lower state, and then mean reverts back up towards $5.05 after Θt switches states
at t = 0.5. We also see from the centre panel of Figure 1 that agents are able to correctly
learn the value of the latent process just by observing the paths of the asset price. The agents’
posterior begins without a preference for the state, but then evolve to realize that the initial
state of the latent process is at Θt = 4.95. After t = 0.5, the agent also identifies the switch
in Θt and adjusts their posterior distribution accordingly. The price impact caused by the
trading activity of agents can be seen in the left panel of Figure 1 as the difference between
Ft and St, which varies over time.
The right panel of Figure 1 displays the inventory values of agents over the trading period.
Agents from sub-population 1 (red) start with (on average) a higher inventory value than those
in sub-population 2 (blue). Agents in sub-population 1 have inventories that very quickly
converge towards the sub-population mean-field, which itself tends to zero quickly. Agents
in sub-population 2 also have inventories that mean-revert to their sub-population mean-
field, but at a much slower rate than those in sub-population 1. This behaviour is consistent
with the observation in Section 3.6 that an individual agent’s inventory and trading rate will
always tend towards their sub-population’s mean-field levels. Furthermore, the speed of the
reversion towards the sub-population mean is controlled by the function hk2,t, which is defined
in Proposition 3.8. Larger values of the parameter φk increase the magnitude of h
k
2,t, and an
increase in the magnitude of hk2,t increases the speed of the reversion towards the mean-field
as pointed out in Section 3.6. Therefore, the difference in the speed of mean-reversion for the
two sub-populations can be explained by differences in the value of the parameter φk.
Moreover, agents in sub-population 2 trade on the latent alpha considerably more than
those in sub-population 1. Members of sub-population 1 seek to liquidate their inventories
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quickly, while members of sub-population 2 are more inclined to take on inventory exposure
due to deviation of the asset price from its filtered mean-reversion level. This also ties back
to the value of the parameter φk, which controls the agent’s risk appetite. Since a lower
value of φk corresponds to a higher risk tolerance, we see more alpha trading stemming from
sub-population 2.
The latent alpha trading observed in sub-population 2 also matches the posterior proba-
bilities (center panel of Figure 1). When the agents estimate that the latent process is in the
lower mean-reversion state, they begin taking on a long position in anticipation of a switch
from the lower state to the upper state, which they expect will occur at least once before the
end of the trading period. After the switch occurs, they begin reversing their position to a net
short, expecting the reverse behaviour. The net short that agents take has a lower magnitude
than the net long that agents previously took because less time remains until the end of the
trading period, since it is both less likely that they will witness another switch and there is
less time remaining before they are forced to completely liquidate their inventories. As the
trading period nears its end, we see agents gradually reduce their exposure to zero so that
they are flat by the end of the trading period.
6. Conclusion. In this paper, we presented a stochastic game model for a market in which
a finite population of players divided into heterogenous sub-populations trades a single asset.
Agents have access to incomplete information of the market and of the actions of other agents,
and we derive the mean-field game in the limit of infinite number of players. Using techniques
from convex analysis allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for the mean-field of each sub-
population and the optimal action for each individual agent. We then show that the solution
obtained by solving the mean-field game in fact satisfies the -Nash property in the finite
player version of the game. Lastly, we present a simulated example of the finite stochastic
game and analyze some of the agent’s behaviour.
There are a number of future directions for this research. Here we outline a few directions,
which is by no means exhaustive. One direction, which we have already begun investigating,
is account for model-heterogeneity. That is, to allow agents in different sub-population to
belief in different models, in addition to having heterogeneous preferences. Another direction
of research is to restrict agents to trade at stopping times, rather than continuously as done
here. Lastly, accounting for model uncertainty/ambiguity aversion along the lines of [10] and
[21] would be a very interesting direction to explore so that agents’ strategies become more
robust.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3 – The Optimal Control Problem.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof. First, let us define Ft = S
ν
t −
∫ t
0
λνu du. Since νt ∈ H2T and νt is F-adapted, it is clear that Ft ∈ H2T
and that Ft is F-adapted.
Let Ât = E [At | Ft]. By it’s definition, Ât is F-adapted. Furthermore, by Jensen’s inequality,
E
∫ T
0
E [At | Ft]2 dt ≤ E
∫ T
0
E
[
A2t | Ft
]
dt .(A.1)
since the integrand is non-negative, we may apply Fubini’s theorem and the tower property,
E
[
E
[∫ T
0
A2t dt | Ft
]]
= E
[∫ T
0
A2t dt
]
<∞ ,(A.2)
therefore Â ∈ H2T .
Next, let us define
(A.3) M̂t = Ft −
∫ T
0
Ât dt .
Since Â and F are F-adapted, M is also F-adapted. Furthermore, for any t ∈ [0, T ]
E[M̂2t ] ≤ 4
(
E[F 2t ] + E
[∫ T
0
Â2u du
])
≤ 32E
[∫ T
0
(
A2u +M
2
u
)
du
]
<∞ ,(A.4)
which demonstrates that M̂ ∈ L2T . Using the dynamics of F , for 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T
E
[
M̂u − M̂t | Ft
]
= E
[
(Fu − Ft)−
∫ t
u
Âs ds
∣∣∣Ft](A.5)
= E
[∫ t
u
(As − Âs) ds+ (Mu −Mt)
∣∣∣Ft] = E [∫ tu(As − Âs) ds ∣∣∣Ft] ,(A.6)
applying Fubini’s theorem and the tower property
E
[∫ t
u
(As − Âs) ds
∣∣∣Ft] = E [∫ t
u
E
[
As − Âs
∣∣∣Fs] ds ∣∣∣∣Ft] = 0 .(A.7)
Therefore,
(A.8) E
[
M̂u | Ft
]
= M̂t
which shows that M̂ is a martingale. From the definitions of M̂ and Â, it is easy to verify that (3.7) is satisfied.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof. To show that the functionals Hj are strictly concave, we must show that for any 0 < ρ < 1, and
ν, ω ∈ Aj where (P× µ)(νt 6= ωt) > 0, that
(A.9) Hj(ρ ν + (1− ρ)ω)− ρHj(ν)− (1− ρ)Hj(ω) > 0 .
First, observe that qj,· is linear in controls:
q
j,ρν+(1−ρ)ω
t = ρ q
j,ν
t + (1− ρ)qj,ωt ,
for all 0 < ρ < 1 and ν, ω ∈ Aj . If we let
Γk =
(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)
,
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and expand the left side of the inequality (A.9), we may use the linearity of qj to cancel out constant terms
and qj,·t (Ât + λ νt) terms. This yields
left part of (A.9) =E
[∫ T
0
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
)
−
(
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))ᵀ
Γk
(
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))
dt
]
(completing the square) =E
[∫ T
0
ρ (1− ρ)
((
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
−
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))ᵀ
Γk
((
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
−
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))
dt
]
.
expanding the above, and letting ∆t = νt − ωt and since q∆t = qj,νt − qj,ωt ,
(A.10) = ρ (1− ρ)E
[∫ T
0
{
ak∆
2
t + φk
(
q∆t
)2
+ 2Ψk∆tq
∆
t
}
dt
]
.
Since 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we only need to demonstrate that the inside of the expected value is greater than zero. Since
φk ≥ 0, we can guarantee that the middle term in (A.10) is ≥ 0. Next, we may look at the right-most term in
equation (A.10). Since we can write q∆t =
∫ t
0
∆u du, integrating by parts yields
(A.11) E
∫ T
0
2∆tq
∆
t dt = E
[(
q∆T
)2]
≥ 0 .
Since Ψk ≥ 0, this last result implies that the right-most term in (A.10) is ≥ 0. Lastly, notice that if
(P× µ)(νt 6= ωt) > 0, then
(A.12) E
[∫ T
0
∆2t dt
]
> 0 .
Since ak > 0, this last comment shows that (A.10) is strictly greater than zero.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3.4.
Proof. Using the definition of the Gaˆteaux derivative,
(A.13)
〈DHj(ν), ω〉 = lim
↘0
Hj(ν +  ω)−Hj(ν)

we will show that this limit exists and is equal to the result provided in the lemma. Using the representation
for the objective Hj (3.8) and canceling out the t = 0 terms and using the linearity of the process q
j,ν
t − qj,ν0
in the variable ν, we have
Hj(ν +  ω)−Hj(ν) = E
[∫ T
0
{
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )(Ât + λ νt)− 2
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)
dt
}]
(A.14)
− 2E
[∫ T
0
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)
dt
]
,(A.15)
where
Γk =
(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)
.
Dividing by  and taking the limit yields
(A.16)
〈DHj(ν), ω〉 = E [∫ T
0
{
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )(Ât + λνt)− 2
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)}
dt
]
.
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Expanding the right part of the integrand in (A.16) and re-grouping terms,
(A.17)
〈DHj(ν), ω〉 = E [∫ T
0
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )
(
Ât + λνt − 2(φkqj,νt + Ψkνt)
)
dt− 2
∫ T
0
ωt
(
akνt + Ψkq
j,ν
t
)
dt
]
.
Since ν, ω ∈ Aj and ν, Aˆ ∈ H2T , the sufficient conditions for Fubini’s theorem are met. Applying Fubini’s
theorem and the tower property〈DHj(ν), ω〉 = ∫ T
0
E
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
{
Ât + λνt − 2φkqj,νu
}
du
)]
dt(A.18)
=
∫ T
0
E
[
ωt E
[
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
{
Ât + λνt − 2φkqj,νu
}
du
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]]
dt(A.19)
= E
[∫ T
0
ωt E
[
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
{
Ât + λνt − 2φkqj,νu
}
du
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
dt
]
,(A.20)
which gives the desired result.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Proof. By using lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 we may apply the results of [12, Section 5] which state that if
(A.21) 〈DHj(νj,∗), ω〉 = 0
for all ω ∈ Aj if and only if
(A.22) νj,∗ = arg sup
νj,∗∈Aj
Hj(ν) ,
the strict concavity of H implies that νj,∗ must be unique up to P × µ null sets. Therefore all we need to
demonstrate is that the derivative vanishes if and only if it is the solution to the stated FBSDE.
Sufficiency: Let us suppose that νj,∗ is the solution to the FBSDE in the statement of the proposition
and that νj,∗ ∈ H2T . We need to show that νj,∗ ∈ Aj and that it makes the Gaˆteaux derivative vanish.
First, let us note that we may represent the solution to the FBSDE implicitly as
(A.23) 2 ak ν
j,∗
t = E
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
Âu + λ νu − 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣Fjt ] ,
which demonstrates that νj,∗ is Fj-adapted. Therefore, since νj,∗ ∈ H2T and νj,∗ is Fj-adapted, we have that
νj,∗ ∈ Aj .
Lastly we show that νj,∗ makes the Gaˆteaux derivative vanish. By plugging (A.23) into the expression for
the Gaˆteaux derivative from lemma 3.4 and using the tower property, we find that it vanishes almost surely.
Necessity: Let us suppose that 〈DHj(νj,∗), ω〉 = 0 for all ω ∈ Aj . This implies that
(A.24) E
[
−2akνj,∗t − 2Ψkqj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
Âu + λνu − 2φkqj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣Fjt ] = 0
P× µ almost everywhere.
To see this, suppose that 〈DHj(νj,∗), ω〉 = 0 for all ω ∈ Aj , but (A.24) does not hold. Then, choose
(A.25) ωt = E
[
−2akνj,∗t − 2Ψkqj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
Âu + λνu − 2φkqj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣Fjt ] .
First, it is clear that this choice of ω is Fjt adapted by its very definition. Second, using the fact that νk ∈ H2T ,
by using Jensen’s inequality and the triangle inequality on (A.25), we can obtain the bound
E
∫ T
0
(ωt)
2 dt ≤ 4 (a2k + T Ψ2k + T 2φ2k)E ∫ T
0
(νj,∗t )
2 dt + E
∫ T
0
(
Â2t + λ
2ν2t
)
dt
<∞ ,
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which implies that ω ∈ H2T and therefore ω ∈ Aj . When we plug this choice of ω into the expression for the
Gaˆteaux derivative, we see that 〈DHj(νj,∗), ω〉 > 0, which contradicts the assumption that 〈DHj(νj,∗), ω〉 = 0
for all ω ∈ Aj .
Using (A.24) and noting that νj,∗t ∈ Fjt , we may write
(A.26) 2 ak ν
j,∗
t = E
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
Âu + λ νu − 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣Fjt ] ,
and
(A.27) 2 akMjt = E
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
0
{
Âu + λ νu − 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣Fjt ] ,
which solves the FBSDE in the statement of the proposition.
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 3 – Solving the BSDEs.
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Proof. The proof will is split in the following parts: We show that
(a) g2,t defined in the statement of the proposition is a bounded and is the unique solution the Riccati ODE (3.16).
(b) g1,t defined in the statement of the proposition is the solution to the BSDE (3.15).
(c) E
[∫ T
0
gᵀ1,tg1,t dt
]
<∞.
Part (a). Let us first point out that the ODE (3.16) is a matrix-valued non-symmetric Riccati-type ODE. We
prove the claims concerning the ODE (3.16) by applying theorems and tools for non-symmetric Riccati ODEs
found in the set of papers [15] and [14]. First of all, let us define g˜2,t = g2,T−t.
We will show that all of the claims hold for g˜2,t, and hence also for g2,t. From ODE (3.16), we find that
(B.1)
{
∂tg˜2,t =
(
Λ + g˜2,t
)
(2a)−1 g˜2,t − 2φ
g˜2,0 = −2Ψ
rl .
Our objective is now to apply [15, Theorem 2.3] on g˜2,t to show the existence and boundedness of a solution.
Using the notation of [15], we define
(B.2) B11 = 0, B12 = −J, B21 = −2φ, B22 = ΛJ .
andW0 = −2Ψ, where J = (2a)−1. To meet the requirements of theorem 2.3 in [15], we must find C,D ∈ RK×K ,
C = Cᵀ so that L+ Lᵀ ≤ 0 and C +DW0 +W ᵀ0Dᵀ > 0, where
(B.3) L =
(
−2Dφ −CJ +DΛJ
0 −JᵀD
)
.
Let D = I (K×K) and C = 5Ψ. With these choices of C,D, and using the fact that Ψ is a diagonal matrix
with positive entries, we find that
(B.4) C +DW0 +W
ᵀ
0D
ᵀ = Ψ > 0 ,
which meets one of the necessary conditions. The choices of C and D also imply that the matrix L takes the
form
(B.5) L =
(
−2φ −(5Ψ + Λ)J
0 −J
)
.
Now, let us note that det(L) = det(−2φ)×det(−J). This directly implies that the set of eigenvalues of L is
the union of the set of eigenvalues of −2φ and those of −J . Since −2φ ≤ 0 and −J < 0, all of the eigenvalues of
L are guaranteed to be non-positive and at least one of them is guaranteed to be non-zero, which implies that
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L < 0. Hence, L + Lᵀ < 0 which meets the second condition of [15, Thm. 2.3], and guarantees the existence
of a solution to the ODE B.1 and hence of (3.16).
Since the solution to g2,t exists and is continuous on the interval [0, T ], it follows that it is also bounded
on this interval. Furthermore, the existence and boundedness of the solution and [14, Thm 3.1] guarantees
that the solution is also unique. Using the representation g˜2,t = PtQ
−1
t from [14] and solving the appropriate
linear ODE system for each, we obtain the solution presented in the statement of the theorem.
Part (b). In this part we show that g1 presented in the statement of the proposition solves the linear
BSDE (3.15). First let us consider the process ξ = (ξt)t∈[0,T ] with ξt ∈ RK×K , defined as
(B.6) ξt =: e
∫ t
0 (Λ+g2,s)(2a)
−1 da : ,
which is the unique solution to the matrix-valued ODE,
(B.7) − dξt = −ξt (Λ + g2,t) (2a)−1 dt,
with the initial condition ξ0 = I
(K×K), where I (K×K) ∈ RK×K is the identity matrix. Using the above ODE
and the BSDE (3.15) to compute the dynamics of the process ξt g1,t, we find that
(B.8) d(ξt g1,t) = ξt1
(K×1)Ât dt− ξt dM˜t ,
with the boundary condition ξT g1,T = 0
(K×K). We may solve the BSDE above explicitly to yield
(B.9) ξt g1,t = E
[∫ T
t
ξu1
(K×1)Âu du
∣∣∣Fjt ] .
Since ξt is guaranteed to be positive definite, we multiply by ξ
−1
t on both sides to obtain the solution for g1,t,
(B.10) g1,t = E
[∫ T
t
ξ−1t ξu 1
(K×1)Âu du
∣∣∣Fjt ] ,
where we may replace ξ−1t ξu by the ordered exponential : e
∫ u
t (Λ+g2,s)(2a)
−1 da : to obtain the final solution.
Part (c). Let ‖·‖ represent the euclidean norm in RK . Since g2,t is a bounded function, the time-ordered
exponential ξt is positive definite and bounded over [0, T ]. Therefore there exists a constant c > 0 so that for
any column vector x ∈ RK
(B.11) sup
t,u∈[0,T ]
‖ξ−1t ξu x‖2 ≤ c ‖x‖2 .
Applying Jensen’s inequality and Fubini’s theorem, along with this last result, to solution for g1,t, we find
E
∫ T
0
‖g1,t ‖2 dt ≤ E
∫ T
0
E
[∫ T
t
‖ξ−1t ξu 1(K×1)Âu‖2 du
∣∣∣Fjt ] dt
≤ cK E
∫ T
0
E
[∫ T
t
(Âu)
2 du
∣∣∣Fjt ] dt
≤ cKT E
∫ T
0
(Âu)
2 du <∞ ,
as desired.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.7.
Proof. Plugging in the ansatz
(B.12) ν˜ t = (2a)
−1 (g1,t + g2,t q˜t)
into the FBSDE (3.12) yields the equation (3.14), which vanishes since g1 and g2 solve (3.15) and (3.16),
respectively. By the definitions of g1 and g2 the boundary condition is satisfied, and therefore ν˜ t above solves
the FBSDE (3.12).
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Since the FBSDE (3.11) is just row k of the vector FBSDE (3.12), ν˜k is trivially the solution to (3.11).
Lastly, we must show that ν˜k ∈ ⋂∞j=1Aj . Inspecting the definition of Aj and Fjt , we find that
(B.13)
∞⋂
j=1
Aj = {ν is Ft-predictable , ν ∈ H2T} .
Therefore, we must show that ν˜k ∈ H2T and that ν˜k is F-predictable. First of all, since g2,t is deterministic
and g1,t is F-predictable, it is clear that ν˜k is F-predictable. Next, notice that ν˜k ∈ H2T if
(B.14) E
∫ T
0
ν˜ᵀt ν˜ t dt <∞ .
Using the fact that dq˜t = ν˜ t dt, we find that
(B.15) dq˜t = (2a)
−1 (g1,t + g2,t q˜t) dt .
Solving this SDE yields
(B.16) q˜t = q˜0 ξt + (2a)
−1
∫ t
0
ξu g1,u du
where
(B.17) ξt = I
K×K +
∫ t
0
ξu (2a)
−1g2,u du ,
for all t > 0. Since a is positive definite and g2,t is bounded, we find that ξt must also be continuous and
bounded over [0, T ]. Therefore, using the boundedness of ξ , the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality,
there exists a constant C > 0 such that
q˜ᵀt q˜t ≤ C
(
q˜ᵀ0 q˜0 +
∫ t
0
gᵀ1,ug1,u du
)
≤ C
(
q˜ᵀ0 q˜0 +
∫ T
0
gᵀ1,ug1,u du
)
.
Now, integrating and taking the expected value,
E
∫ T
0
q˜ᵀt q˜t dt ≤ CT
(
q˜ᵀ0 q˜0 +
∫ T
0
gᵀ1,ug1,u du
)
.
Noting that q˜0 is bounded and that E
∫ T
0
gᵀ1,t g1,t dt,∞, we find that
(B.18) E
∫ T
0
q˜ᵀt q˜t dt <∞ .
Now using this result and applying the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality to the expression for ν˜ ,
E
∫ T
0
ν˜ᵀt ν˜ t dt ≤ (2a)−2
(
E
∫ T
0
gᵀ1,tg1,t dt+ E
∫ T
0
(g2,tq˜t)
ᵀ(g2,tq˜t) dt
)
≤
(
E
∫ T
0
gᵀ1,tg1,t dt+ C E
∫ T
0
q˜ᵀt q˜t dt
)
<∞ ,
where we use the boundedness of g2,t in the second line to obtain C > 0, and thus obtaining the desired result.
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B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.8.
Proof. To prove the claims made in the statement of the proposition, we must show that the stated form
of νjt solves the FBSDE (3.22). First, by plugging in the ansatz
(B.19) νjt = ν˜
k
t +
1
2ak
hk2,t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
into the FBSDE, we obtain the simplification
−2ak dν˜kt − dhk2,t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
− 1
4a2k
(
hk2,t
)2 (
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
dt =
(
Ât + λ
ᵀ ν˜ t − 2φkqj,ν
j
t
)
dt− dMjt .
Plugging in the FBSDE for ν˜kt from equation (3.11) and choosing Mjt = Mkt , we can cancel out terms and
obtain the equation
(B.20) 0 =
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
){
dhk2,t +
(
1
4a2k
(
hk2,t
)2
− 2φ
)
dt
}
,
which must hold almost surely for all values of (qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t ). Therefore, solving for h
k
2,t which will make the
terms inside of the curly brackets vanish will also solve FBSDE (3.22). Therefore, setting the terms inside of
the curly brackets to zero and inserting the appropriate boundary condition, we get the ODE
(B.21)
 −dh
k
2,t =
(
1
4a2
k
(
hk2,t
)2 − 2φ) dt
hk2,T = −2Ψk
.
This last ODE is of the well studied Riccati-type with the solution presented in the statement of the theorem.
Next, we wish to demonstrate that hk2,t ≥ 0. First, let us notice that since t < T and γk ≥ 0 that
sinh(−γk(T − t)) ≤ 0 and cosh(−γk(T − t)) ≥ 1. Since ξk,Ψk ≥ 0 we then get that
(B.22)
Ψk cosh (−γk(T − t) )− ξk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
ξk cosh (−γk(T − t) )−Ψk sinh (−γk(T − t) ) ≥ 0 ,
and the desired result follows.
Lastly, we wish to show that νj ∈ Aj . First, note that νj it is sufficient to show that νj − ν˜k ∈ Aj , since
ν˜kt ∈ Aj . First, let ∆t = qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t . From the statement of the proposition we get that
(B.23) d∆t =
hk2,t
2 ak
∆t dt ,
with the boundary condition ∆0 = Q
j
0 − mk0 . Since the
hk2,t
2 ak
is deterministic and the boundary condition is
Fj-adapted, it is clear that ∆t is Fj-adapted. We may solve the SDE directly to yield the solution
(B.24) ∆t =
(
Qj0 −mk0
)
e
∫ t
0
hk2,u
2 ak
du
.
Since Qj0 has a bounded variance and h2,t is a bounded function, it is clear that ∆ ∈ H2T . Hence , ∆ ∈ Aj .
Now because νjt − ν˜kt =
hk2,t
2 ak
∆t, and h2,t is a bounded and deterministic function, we find that ν
j − ν˜k ∈ Aj .
B.4. Proof of Theorem 3.9. We begin by introducing the following lemma, which will be used in
the proof of Theorem 3.9.
Lemma B.1. Let νjt be the ansatz mean-field optimal control defined in Proposition 3.7 for an agent j in
sub-population k. Then
(B.25) qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t =
(
Qj0 −mk0
)
e
1
2ak
∫ t
0 h
k
2,u du ,
where Qk0 is the initial value of j’s inventory, m
k
0 = EQj0, and h
k
2,t is the function defined in proposition 3.8
satisfying the property h2,t < 0.
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Proof. From Proposition 3.8, we have
(B.26) νjt = ν˜
k
t + f
k
t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
,
where we let fkt =
hk2,t
2ak
. Using the above equation and noting that ∂t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
= νjt − ν˜kt , we get that
(B.27) ∂t
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
= fkt
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
.
Solving the above ODE with the initial condition qk0 = Q
k
0 and q˜
k
0 = m
k
0 yields the desired result.
Now we proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.9.
Proof. To prove the first result of the theorem, we study the difference νkt − ν˜kt , where
(B.28) νkt = lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
νjt .
Using the ansatz for νjt from Proposition 3.8, we get
(B.29) νjt − νkt =
hk2,t
2ak
(
qj,ν
j
t − q˜k,ν˜
k
t
)
.
Using the result from Lemma B.1, this becomes
(B.30) νjt − νkt =
(
Qj0 −mk0
)
fkt ,
where fkt =
hk2,t
2ak
e
1
2ak
∫ t
0 h
k
2,u du is a bounded, continuous function. Taking the average over all j ∈ KNk and
taking the limit, we see that
(B.31) lim
N→∞
 1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
νjt
− ν˜kt = fkt lim
N→∞
 1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
(
Qj0 −mk0
) .
Since the collection {Qj0}j∈K(N)
k
is a collection of independent random variables with EQj0 = m
k
0 and bounded
variance, we may apply the law of large numbers which makes the right limit in (B.31) vanish almost surely
and in L2. Therefore computing the left limit we have that
(B.32) νkt − ν˜kt = 0 ,
almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Which implies that ν˜ t = ν t almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since ν˜ t = ν t, we find that ν˜t = νt = limN→∞ 1N
∑N
j=1 ν
j,∗
t . Since the proposed form of ν
j,∗
t also solves
the FBSDE (3.11), ν˜t = νt almost surely and ν
j,∗ ∈ Aj , we find that νj,∗t also solves the optimality FBSDE
from Theorem (3.5). Hence, applying Theorem (3.5), the collection {νj,∗}∞j=1 is optimal and satisfies
(B.33) νj,∗ = arg sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν) ,
for all j.
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 4 – -Nash Property.
C.1. Proof of Theorem 4.2. We begin the proof of Theorem 4.2 by introducing two lemmas. The
first is a lemma provides a closed-form expression for the difference of an agent’s mean-field optimal control
and it’s own sub-population’s mean-field inventory. The second is a lemma regarding the distance between the
mean-field game objective Hj and the finite player game objective Hj .
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Lemma C.1. Let νj,∗ be the mean-field optimal control for an agent j in sub-population k. Then
(C.1) qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯kt =
(
Qj0 −mk0
)
e
1
2ak
∫ t
0 h2,u du ,
where Qk0 is the initial value of j’s inventory, m
k
0 = EQj0, and h2,t is the function defined in proposition 3.8
satisfying h2,t < 0.
Proof. The result is found by using Lemma B.1 along with Theorem 3.9.
Lemma C.2. Let ν ∈ Aj be some arbitrary admissible control and ν∗,−j ∈ A−j be the collection ν−j,∗ :=(
ν1,∗, . . . , νj−1,∗, νj+1,∗, . . . , νN,∗
)
of mean-field optimal controls for all agents except for j. Then
(C.2)
∣∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j,∗)−Hj(ν)∣∣∣ = o(δN ) + o( 1
N
) .
Proof. We will show that the claim holds by instead demonstrating the equivalent claim that
(C.3)
∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j,∗)−Hj(ν)∣∣2 = o(δ2N ) + o( 1N2 ) .
Using the representation for Hj (3.8) and the representation for Hj (2.12), we find that the square of their
difference is equal to
(C.4)
∣∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j,∗)−Hj(ν)∣∣∣2 = λ2 E [∫ T
0
(ν
(N)
t − νt) dt
]2
.
Therefore it is sufficient for us to show that quantity on the right side of the equation is o(N−2) + o(δ2N ). If we
consider the expected value appearing in equation (C.4), we can apply the definition of ν(N) to decompose it
as
(C.5) E
[∫ T
0
(ν
(N)
t − νt) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
1
N
(
νt − νj,∗
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
νi,∗ − νt
)
dt
]
,
where νj,∗t is the mean-field optimal control for agent j. Using the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality
on the left, we find that
(C.6) (C.4) ≤ λ
N2
E
[∫ T
0
(
νt − νj,∗t
)2
dt
]
+ λE
[∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ν∗,i − νt
)
dt
]2
.
ν, νj ∈ Aj ⊂ H2T implies that E
[∫ T
0
(
νt − νj,∗t
)2
dt
]
<∞, and so
(C.7)
λ
N2
E
[∫ T
0
(
νt − νj,∗t
)2
dt
]
= o(N−2) .
At this point, all that remains is to investigate the term
(C.8) E
[∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
νi,∗t − νt
)
dt
]2
.
Using the notation p
(N)
k =
N
(N)
k
N
and ν
k,(N)
t =
1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k
νi,∗t , we may write
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
νi,∗t − νt
)
=
K∑
k=1
{
p
(N)
k ν
k,(N)
t − pkνkt
}
=
K∑
k=1
{
ν
k,(N)
t
(
p
(N)
k − pk
)
+ pk
(
ν
k,(N)
t − νkt
)}
.
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Using this last result and the triangle inequality, we get
(C.9) lhs of (C.8) ≤
K∑
k=1
{
E
[∫ T
0
ν
k,(N)
t dt
]2 (
p
(N)
k − pk
)2
+ pk E
[∫ T
0
(
ν
k,(N)
t − νkt
)
dt
]2}
.
First, by plugging in the result Lemma C.1 taking the average over all i ∈ K(N)k to compute νk,(N) − νk we get
E
[∫ T
0
(
ν
k,(N)
t − νkt
)
dt
]
=
(∫ T
0
e
∫ t
0
h2,s
2ak
ds
dt
)
1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k
E
[
Qj0 −mk0
]
(C.10)
= 0 ,(C.11)
which implies that E
[∫ T
0
ν
k,(N)
t dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
νkt dt
]
. Applying this to (C.9), and noting that νkt ∈ H2T we get
(C.12) (C.9) ≤ C0
K∑
k=1
(
p
(N)
k − pk
)2
= o(δ2N )
for some C > 0. Putting this all back together, we find that
(C.13)
∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j)−Hj(ν)∣∣2 = o(δ2N ) + o(N−2) ,
for some other constant C1 > 0. Taking the root of both sides, and noting that
(C.14)
√
o(δ2N ) + o(N
−2) = o(δN ) + o(N
−1)
we obtain the final result.
C.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. We prove the result of the theorem by using the Lemma C.1. First, let us note that by the definition
of the supremum,
(C.15) Hj(ω, ν
−j,∗) ≤ sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗)
holds for all ω ∈ Aj , and therefore the left-most inequality in the statement of Theorem 4.2 holds.
Next, we must show that the right-most inequality in the statement of Theorem 4.2 also holds. First let
us note that by Lemma C.1, for any ν ∈ Aj ,
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(ν) + o(δN ) + o(N−1)(C.16)
≤ Hj(νj,∗) + o(δN ) + o(N−1) ,(C.17)
where we use the fact that Hj(ν
j,∗) = supν∈Aj Hj(ν). Applying Lemma C.1 again, we find that
(C.18) Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(νj , ν−j,∗) + 2 o(δN ) + 2 o(N−1) .
Since the above inequality holds for all ν ∈ Aj we may take the supremum on the left, and cancel out the
constant terms multiplying the little-o terms to yield the final result,
(C.19) sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(νj , ν−j,∗) + o(δN ) + o(N−1) .
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